What did the 2026 BRICS summit actually achieve?
New Delhi secured agreement among rivals. What that means for diplomacy, payments and India’s influence.
BRICS left New Delhi with a joint declaration after a summit on 12–13 September 2026. That sounds routine until you consider who had to agree: Iran and the United Arab Emirates, divided by the war in West Asia, were part of the same negotiation. India secured a common statement from governments with sharply different interests. Akashvani reported its adoption on 12 September.
The result helps explain both the usefulness and the limits of BRICS. Its members want a larger say in international decisions, but they do not share a single foreign policy. They can agree to keep talking, demand institutional reform and explore cheaper ways to pay one another while disagreeing about wars, borders and strategic partnerships.
To judge this summit, it helps to separate three things: what the group agreed, which conversations it made possible, and what still has to be implemented. Each can matter, but they produce different kinds of results.
Why these countries meet in the first place
The BRICS name comes from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The grouping has expanded beyond those five. India’s official summit backgrounder, published on 10 September, lists eleven members, also including Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. There is a separate partner-country category for wider participation.
What connects them is a demand for more influence over institutions that shape international life. The United Nations provides a forum for diplomacy; its Security Council has particular powers over international peace and security. The International Monetary Fund, or IMF, lends to countries facing external-payment problems. The World Bank supports development, while the World Trade Organization provides a framework for trade rules and disputes.
These institutions affect who receives financial help, on what terms, and how disagreements between governments are handled. BRICS gives its members a place to coordinate demands for changes. When leaders invoke the Global South, they broadly mean developing and emerging economies across several continents, rather than countries that all sit south of the equator.
That shared demand does not remove competing interests. India wants room to work with Russia and China while maintaining relationships with the United States and other Western countries. Iran and the UAE have their own security concerns. As AP’s pre-summit report explained, expansion has widened the grouping’s reach while exposing more divisions within it.
Why a joint declaration can be difficult
A summit declaration is a negotiated statement of what the participating governments can jointly support. Officials do much of the preparation before leaders arrive. The wording matters because a sentence that sounds neutral to one government may appear to blame another or endorse its rival’s position.
West Asia made that problem concrete. Ahead of the meeting, Reuters reported that Iranian attacks on the UAE and the UAE’s suspension of trade and financial transactions with Iran had put the two members on opposing sides of the conflict. Finding language both could accept was a central test for the host.
The declaration called for restraint, protection of civilians and respect for sovereignty. It also stressed the importance of trade, energy flows and maritime security. Iran and the UAE both backed it, according to Reuters’ account of the agreement.
Governments in conflict accepted common principles on which further talks could build. Reopening trade routes or restoring financial ties will require decisions by the governments and institutions involved.
The declaration also criticised attacks on civilian infrastructure and safeguarded peaceful nuclear facilities, and opposed sanctions outside the UN framework, AP reported. Sanctions are restrictions intended to put pressure on a target, including through trade or finance. Opposition in a joint statement does not remove the restrictions a bank or company faces when it handles a transaction.
The meetings beside the meeting
Leaders also hold bilateral meetings: discussions between two countries outside the main group session. These can use the summit as an opportunity without becoming agreements binding on every BRICS member.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan on 12 September. Reuters, citing the Abu Dhabi Media Office, reported that their discussion covered de-escalation, stability and regional peace. No settlement was announced.
Direct contact matters because governments need ways to explain intentions, communicate concerns and test whether compromise is possible. A channel can remain useful even when the first meeting produces little that can be announced. Its value becomes clearer through subsequent actions, rather than the photograph alone.
For India, the Modi–Xi meeting presented a different version of the same challenge: how to make a difficult relationship function. The leaders discussed business links, mobility, trade imbalances, supply-chain concerns and market access, according to IANS’ report of India’s statement.
Market access means the practical ability to sell into another country’s market. For an Indian exporter, a friendlier relationship is useful if it results in a product being admitted, a restriction being eased or a more predictable approval process. An importer needs dependable supplies of machinery or components. Those are observable improvements to look for after the meeting.
Easier payments do not require a BRICS currency
The currency used in a transaction and the system that carries the payment are different things. Banks can improve the route a payment takes while keeping the currencies businesses already use.
India’s BRICS sherpa, Sudhakar Dalela, said on 12 September that there was no current proposal for a common BRICS currency. He described local-currency settlement as a way to reduce transaction costs, complementary to the wider payment system. The report of his briefing also describes ongoing work on connecting payment and messaging channels.
- Local-currency settlementWhich money?
Buyer and seller use an existing national currency, such as rupees.
The currency changes; conversion and exchange-rate questions remain.
- Connected payment systemsHow does it move?
Banks or payment networks connect to transfer and settle money more efficiently.
The connection changes; countries can retain their own currencies.
- A common currencyWho issues the money?
Countries share a currency under an agreed monetary framework.
A different institutional commitment. India said no proposal was on the table.
Conceptual comparison. Summit status: Dalela’s 12 September briefing, reported by First India.
Imagine an Indian buyer ordering goods from a Brazilian supplier. The two businesses agree on a price and a currency. Their banks then need to move the payment and make the money available to the seller. A better connection between the banks could reduce delays or costs without requiring either country to abandon its currency.
Settling in a national currency raises a different practical question: what can the recipient do with that money? A supplier receiving rupees may want to buy Indian goods, hold the money or convert it. The available options, exchange rate and conversion costs help determine whether the arrangement is attractive. If trade runs heavily in one direction, the country selling more may accumulate currency it has limited uses for.
This is why a payment announcement needs to be judged through actual transactions: which banks participate, which currencies work, what users pay and how reliably the service settles money. The summit continued work on those payment options.
IMF reform requires a wider coalition
The push to reform international institutions has a similar gap between agreement and implementation. At the summit, Modi called for representation and decision-making to reflect a changed world. A joint BRICS position can give that demand greater diplomatic weight. The institution being asked to change still has its own rules.
Consider the IMF. Each member has a quota, broadly reflecting its relative economic position. Quotas help determine financial contributions and voting power. Countries therefore have a direct interest in how quotas are distributed; this affects their influence over the institution’s decisions.
This is voting power, not a count of countries. A member must also consent to a change in its own quota.
Source: IMF, “General quota reviews”. Checked 13 September 2026. A rule, not a summit vote result.
The IMF’s explanation of quota reviews says quota changes require approval by 85% of total voting power, as well as a member’s consent to change its own quota. Agreement among BRICS leaders cannot substitute for that process. Reform requires building enough support inside the IMF, including among countries outside BRICS.
This gives the demand a concrete meaning. The question is not simply whether leaders favour a fairer system, but which distribution of influence they will accept and whether a sufficient coalition will support it. The same broad call for reform can conceal different preferred outcomes.
What India can count now, and what must wait
India obtained explicit support on a security priority. The declaration condemned the April 2025 Pahalgam attack and called for zero tolerance towards state-sponsored cross-border terrorism, PTI reported. That puts a shared position on record. Its practical effect will depend on cooperation by the governments involved.
In his 13 September speech, Xi proposed an AI open-source community, a special economic zone partnership and a forum on trade in services in the following year. For prospective participants, the next step is to see the funding and operating arrangements.
Eligibility, access to tools and the rules for using them will determine what technology cooperation offers a participating business or researcher. Those details would turn a broad proposal into an opportunity someone can assess.
BRICS also has institutions whose work can already be examined, including the New Development Bank. Our earlier explainer follows what India gets from BRICS through development lending and diplomatic access. Those existing benefits should be distinguished from commitments made at this particular summit.
New Delhi’s clearest achievement was to secure a common statement despite serious divisions and provide space for important bilateral discussions. The next assessment should follow what changes: renewed Iran–UAE engagement, identifiable improvements in India–China business access, payments that companies can use, and projects that obtain funding. For readers in India, that is how a diplomatic gathering starts to connect with supplies, business costs and economic opportunities. The declaration gives those efforts a political starting point; the work after the summit determines their value.